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In t he
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 13-1708 
Kim b e r l y  Sp u r l in g ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
C&M Fin e  Pa c k , In c .,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Indiana, Fort Wayne Division.
No. 1:11-cv-00039 — Philip P. Simon, Chief Judge.
Ar g u e d  Se p t e m b e r  23, 2013 — De c id e d  Ja n u a r y  13, 2014
Before BAUER, KANNE, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.
KANNE, Circuit Judge. This appeal follows the district court's 
entry of summary judgment in favor of C&M Fine Pack, Inc., 
("C&M ") regarding its termination of Kimberly Spurling. 
Spurling alleged that C&M discriminated against her in 
violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, as amended 
("ADA"), as well as the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 
("FMLA"). For the reasons set forth below, we affirm in part, 
reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
AUTHENTICATED 
U.S. GOVERNMENT 
INFORMATION ^
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I. Ba c k g r o u n d
A. Spurling's Employment at C&M
Spurling began working for C&M in February 2004 as a 
Forming Inspector/Packer assigned to the third/night shift. In 
2009, she began to exhibit a pattern of decreased consciousness 
and alertness, for which she received several disciplinary 
warnings. Spurling received a Final Warning/Suspension on 
February 15, 2010. On that date, Spurling left her work site to 
use the restroom and did not return for over twenty minutes. 
Spurling was later found sleeping in the restroom by a co­
worker.
Following her suspension, Spurling met with plant man­
ager Darrin Claussen and three of her supervisors. Claussen's 
meeting notes reflect that Spurling indicated that her sleep 
issues were caused by medication that her doctor had pre­
scribed. She produced a note to the same effect, which stated, 
"Pt was recently asked to discontinue medicine related to her 
passing out—please excuse symptoms [at] work."
Spurling continued to experience difficulty remaining 
conscious while at work. On April 12, 2010, Jim Cardenas, 
Spurling's shift supervisor, reported her for being completely 
asleep while packing parts. He expressed concern for Spurl­
ing's safety and the lack of improvement in her wakefulness.
As a result of the continuing problem, Spurling attended a 
meeting with management personnel, who issued her a Final 
W arn in g / Su sp en sio n  on A p r i l  15. The F in a l  
Warning/Suspension note stated:
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On 4/12/10 you were observed ... with your head 
down at you[r] inspection station. To get your 
attention they had to yell your name at which time 
you snapped to and responded. This occurred 
several times during the shift ... A review of your 
personnel file shows that in the last twelve months 
you have received three write-ups for performance 
and the last one a final warning with suspension for 
sleeping during your shift. Per our progressive 
discipline practice you have been suspended pend­
ing determination of the level of discipline you will 
receive for this latest incident. You were informed 
that you could face termination of employment per 
our progressive disciplinary practice. You were 
informed that I would be in touch no later than 
Monday, April 19[,] with [C&M]'s decision. You 
were also informed that if you had further informa­
tion that was relevant to our deliberation, you 
needed to contact me prior to Monday.
Paul Bellant, the Human Resources Manager at C&M, 
testified that it was typical for C&M to wait almost two weeks 
for new information to be produced for consideration in 
whether to terminate an employee. On April 16, Spurling 
informed Bellant that her performance issues might be related 
to a medical condition. Bellant met with Spurling to provide 
her with a letter regarding the ADA and documentation for 
Spurling's physician to complete. The paperwork stated that it 
should be returned no later than April 30.
After Spurling received the paperwork, she alleges that she 
requested time off to determine the extent of her medical
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issues. Bellant denies that Spurling ever requested time off, 
and insists that she was not eligible for FMLA leave as she was 
facing suspension pending termination of employment.
That same day, April 16, after giving the ADA paperwork 
to Spurling, Bellant emailed C&M's Vice President of Human 
Resources, Jeffrey Swoyer, concerning the action that C&M 
wanted to pursue regarding Spurling. Bellant's email recom­
mended that C&M terminate Spurling, but conceded that in 
order to do so, Swoyer's authorization was required. The email 
acknowledges Bellant's communication with Spurling and 
states, "I have ADA paperwork that she will have her doctor 
fill out to begin the interactive process regarding her ability to 
perform ... her job safely. I will put her on [leave of absence] 
until process is completed."
Spurling met with her physician, Dr. James Beitzel, on April 
21. He filled out the ADA paperwork and marked "yes" by the 
box asking if the patient had a mental or physical disability 
covered under the ADA. Dr. Beitzel wrote that Spurling 
exhibited excessive drowsiness that affected her job performa­
nce and recommended periods of scheduled rest. Finally, he 
wrote "add'n medical work up in progress" at the bottom of 
the form.
Directly after her medical examination, Spurling took the 
paperwork to Bellant, who told her that he and Claussen 
would review the material and then send it to the corporate 
office for further review. Spurling alleges, and C&M disputes, 
that Bellant indicated that C&M would have an interactive 
meeting with her on April 26 to discuss her request for 
reasonable accommodations. No meeting occurred.
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Regarding the import of Dr. Beitzel's examination, Bellant 
testified that the notation stating Spurling was suffering from 
a condition covered by the ADA was insufficient to establish 
that she had a disability. Likewise, Swoyer testified during his 
deposition, "I don't believe that the doctor is in a position to 
make that determination. It is his opinion." Instead of seeking 
clarification from Dr. Beitzel regarding Spurling's medical 
evaluation, C&M chose to proceed with her termination.
On April 28, Bellant emailed Swoyer his recommendation 
to terminate Spurling. He stated, "[W]e recommend the 
aggressive approach. Upon review of all the facts presented we 
feel that we did the interactive process during the progressive 
disciplinary process." Bellant acknowledged that while "there 
is an element of risk ... we feel we did everything during the 
discipline process."
C&M proceeded with the termination of Spurling and 
informed her of its decision on April 28, 2010. On May 27, 2010, 
Spurling received a definitive diagnosis for narcolepsy, which 
in her case is manageable with proper medication.
B. District Court Proceedings
Spurling brought suit and made three claims under the 
ADA: disability discrimination, failure of the interactive 
process, and failure to provide reasonable accommodations.1 1
1
Failure of the interactive process is not an independent basis for liability 
under the ADA. Ozlowski v. Henderson, 237 F.3d 837, 840 (7th Cir. 2001). An 
employee must still show that she is a "qualified individual with a 
disability" and that a reasonable accommodation would have allowed her
(continued...)
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She also claimed that C&M interfered with her rights under the 
FMLA.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of 
C&M on both claims, holding that an employer could not be 
held accountable for discrimination under the ADA when both 
the employer and employee are unaware that a condition 
exists. The court stated that the central issue was one of 
causation; that is, whether Spurling suffered an adverse 
employment action as a result of her disability. It found that 
the termination took place on April 15, when Bellant's initial 
termination recommendation was made. The court found that 
C&M could not have discriminated against Spurling, as it had 
terminated her prior to having any knowledge of her condi­
tion.
For the same reason, Spurling's FMLA claim failed. The 
district court held that, since C&M was unaware of Spurling's 
qualifying condition, it could not be held liable for firing her 
because of that condition. The FMLA requires employer 
knowledge of the qualifying condition, which C&M did not 
have when it terminated Spurling on April 15. 1
1 (...continued)
to perform the essential functions of her job. Bombard v. Fort Wayne 
Newspapers, Inc., 92 F.3d 560, 563 (7th Cir. 1996). Thus, "a plaintiff must 
allege that the employer's failure to engage in an interactive process 
resulted in a failure to identify an appropriate accommodation for the 
qualified individual." Rehling v. City of Chi., 207 F.3d 1009, 1016 (7th Cir. 
2000).
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II. Analysis
Spurling challenges the district court's decision to grant 
C&M summary judgment on both her ADA and FMLA claims. 
Spurling argues that the district court erred in finding that 
April 15 was the effective date of her termination. She alleges 
that she was not actually fired until April 28, at which time 
C&M knew that she suffered from a disability covered under 
the ADA.
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, and 
examine the record and all reasonable inferences in the light 
most favorable to the non-moving party. Pagen v. TIN Inc., 695 
F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir. 2012). Summary judgment is proper if 
the moving party "shows that there is no genuine dispute as to 
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We will reverse a grant of 
summary judgment if a material issue of fact exists that would 
allow a reasonable jury to find in favor of the non-moving 
party. Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 721 F.3d 444, 449 
(7th Cir. 2013).
A. ADA Claim
To establish a prima facie ADA claim, Spurling must show 
that: "(1) she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA, (2) 
she is qualified to perform the essential functions of her job 
either with or without reasonable accommodation, and (3) she 
has suffered from an adverse employment decision because of 
her disability." Dvorak v. Mostardi Platt Assoc., Inc., 289 F.3d 
479, 483 (7th Cir. 2002).
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1. Termination Date
The district court relied on our holding in Hedberg v. Indiana 
Bell Tel. Co, Inc., 47 F.3d 928, 932-33 (7th Cir. 1995), to find that 
C&M did not have the requisite knowledge to fire Spurling 
"because of" her disability. Citing that case, the district court 
reasoned that an employer who fires an employee without 
knowledge of her disability relies on other, non-disability 
related, grounds. It determined that C&M fired Spurling on 
April 15 and found that C&M's lack of knowledge regarding 
Spurling's disability obviated the need to decide whether she 
was actually disabled.
The district court's reliance on Hedberg as analogous to this 
case is misplaced. Hedberg involved a restructuring of a 
company, in which layoffs and firings were inevitable and 
based on a neutral score given to employees. Hedberg received 
a poor score, which he attributed to his disability, but 
Hedberg's employers had no knowledge of his disability when 
they made their final decision to terminate his employment. 
Hedberg stands for the well-established principle that an 
employee cannot hold an employer liable under the ADA if the 
employer has no knowledge of the employee's disability. 29
C.F.R. app. § 1630.9 ("[A]n employer would not be expected to 
accommodate disabilities of which it is unaware."); see also 
James v. Hyatt Regency Chi., 707 F.3d 775, 783 (7th Cir. 2013); 
Beck v. Univ. o f Wis. Bd. o f Regents, 75 F.3d 1130, 1134 (7th Cir. 
1996); Hedberg, 47 F.3d at 932. But that is not the case here.
The actual issue in this case is whether Bellant's April 15 
email sufficed to terminate Spurling. If it did, she was termi­
nated before C&M knew of her disability. But if it did not,
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C&M did not fire her until after learning of it. We have 
adopted an "unequivocal notice of termination" test to 
determine the date that an employee has been terminated. 
Dvorak, 289 F.3d at 486. It states that "termination occurs when 
the employer shows, by acts or words, clear intention to 
dispense with the employee's services." Id. There are two 
prongs to the test, both of which must be satisfied to fix the 
date of termination. "First, there must be a final, ultimate, non­
tentative decision to terminate the employee ... . Second, the 
employer must give the employee 'unequivocal' notice of its 
final termination decision." Flannery v. Recording Indus. Ass'n 
of A m , 354 F.3d 632, 637 (7th Cir. 2004).
C&M's April 15 email may have begun the investigation 
into terminating Spurling, but it certainly did not manifest a 
clear intention to dispense with her services. Nor was the 
decision to terminate her ever communicated to her prior to 
April 28. Spurling was technically suspended pending a 
termination decision on April 15, not terminated outright. 
Indeed, Bellant informed Spurling that she could present new 
information that may be 'relevant to our deliberation,' which 
she did. After Spurling informed C&M that she might have a 
medical condition affecting her work, Bellant gave her ADA 
paperwork to be filled out by her doctor; it would seem as 
though C&M began to engage in the interactive process with 
Spurling. When C&M learned of her disability, however, it 
chose to take the "aggressive approach" and terminate her. 
This occurred on April 28, which is the date that her actual 
termination took place and when she received her unequivocal 
notice. Thus, Spurling was fired after C&M knew that she had 
a medical condition covered under the ADA.
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2. Failure to Accommodate
Having determined that Spurling's termination was on 
April 28, we next turn to whether C&M properly accommo­
dated Spurling after she notified them of her condition. We 
conclude that it did not. An employee begins the accommoda­
tion process by notifying her employer of her disability; "at 
that point, an employer's liability is triggered for failure to 
provide accommodations." Hendricks-Robinson v. Excel Corp., 
154 F.3d 685, 693 (7th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). After an employee has disclosed that she has a 
disability, the ADA requires an employer to "engage with the 
employee in an 'interactive process' to determine the appropri­
ate accommodation under the circumstances." E.E.O.C. v. Sears, 
Roebuck & Co., 417 F.3d 789, 805 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Gile v. 
United Airlines, Inc., 213 F.3d 365, 373 (7th Cir. 2000)).
Rather than collaborate with Spurling or her doctor to find 
a reasonable accommodation, C&M chose to turn a blind eye 
and terminate her. It did not seek further clarification from 
either Spurling or her doctor and disregarded the medical 
evaluation altogether. This is hardly engaging with Spurling to 
determine if a reasonable accommodation could be made. See 
Bultemeyer v. Fort Wayne Comm. Sch., 100 F.3d 1281, 1286 (7th 
Cir. 1996) (employer should have sought an explanation from 
the doctor if it had concerns with the employee's medical 
diagnosis). And while an employer's failure to engage in the 
interactive process alone is not an independent basis for 
liability, it is actionable "if it prevents identification of an 
appropriate accommodation for a qualified individual." Basden 
v. Prof'l Transp., Inc., 714 F.3d 1034, 1039 (7th Cir. 2013). 
Accordingly, Spurling must show that a reasonable accommo-
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dation could be made that would enable her to carry out the 
essential functions of her job. Id. The evidence suggests that a 
reasonable accommodation was readily available; Spurling 
simply needed further medical testing and a prescription to 
control her narcolepsy.
Once C&M received notice of Spurling's disability on April 
21, it was incumbent upon them to determine, by engaging in 
an interactive process with Spurling, whether a reasonable 
accommodation could be made. See Hedberg, 47 F.3d at 934 
("[I]f an employee tells his employer that he has a disability, 
the employer then knows of the disability, and the ADA's 
further requirements bind the employer."). This process entails 
working with the disabled individual to produce a reasonable 
solution if one is available. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9 ("Once an 
individual with a disability has requested provision of a 
reasonable accommodation, the employer must make a 
reasonable effort to determine the appropriate accommodation. 
The appropriate reasonable accommodation is best determined 
through a flexible, interactive process that involves both the 
employer and the individual with a disability.").
C&M never engaged in an interactive attempt to find a 
reasonable accommodation as claimed in the April 28 email 
from Bellant to Swoyer ("we feel that we did the interactive 
process during the progressive disciplinary process."). Spurl- 
ing returned with C&M's ADA form, on which Dr. Beitzel 
indicated that she had a condition covered under the ADA. 
Despite this notation, C&M never contacted Dr. Beitzel to 
determine the severity of Spurling's ADA claim or how it 
might be able to provide a reasonable accommodation. 
Following a series of emails, it decided to terminate her,
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despite the "element of risk." And, while it is true that Spurl- 
ing presented the information to C&M after receiving her 
Suspension Pending Termination, she did so at C&M's behest. 
C&M properly began the interactive process as envisioned by 
the ADA, but failed to carry it through.
B. FMLA Claim
To establish her FMLA claim, Spurling must show: (1) she 
was eligible for FMLA protection; (2) C&M is covered by the 
FMLA; (3) she was entitled to take leave under the FMLA; (4) 
she provided sufficient notice of her intent to take leave to 
C&M; and (5) C&M denied her FMLA benefits to which she 
was entitled. Goelzer v. Sheboygan Cnty., Wis., 604 F.3d 987, 993 
(7th Cir. 2010). For the purposes of this case, we are only 
concerned with the fourth element: whether Spurling provided 
sufficient notice to C&M regarding her "serious health 
condition." 29 C.F.R. § 825.100. If she did not, then C&M had 
no duty to grant her leave.
We first note that a "serious health condition entitling an 
employee to FMLA leave means an illness, injury, impairment 
or physical or mental condition that involves inpatient care ... 
or continuing treatment by a health care provider[.]" 29 C.F.R. 
§ 825.113(a). The latter phrase would likely qualify Spurling 
under the FMLA, so long as she alerted her employer to the 
seriousness of her health condition. Nicholson v. Pulte Homes 
Corp., 690 F.3d 819, 826 (7th Cir. 2012).
Spurling's statement to Bellant on April 16 (and prior to her 
medical evaluation), was simply that she needed time off to
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figure out why she was falling asleep.2 Given the circum­
stances of this case, this can hardly be deemed as notifying 
C&M of a "serious health condition." An employee must 
provide her employer with sufficient information to notify 
them that she has a serious health condition that requires 
FMLA protection. See Stevenson v. Hyre Elec. Co., 505 F.3d 720, 
725 (7th Cir. 2012). We cannot hold that the employer must 
divine or investigate whether an employee has a condition 
covered under the FMLA at any minor request for leave. We 
have explicitly rejected that position, as the majority of leaves 
requested by employees do not give rise to FMLA protections. 
Aubuchon v. Knauf Fiberglass GmbH, 359 F.3d 950, 953 (7th Cir. 
2004). To hold otherwise would "place a substantial and 
largely wasted investigative burden on employers." Id. 
Therefore, "unless the employer already knows that the 
employee has an FMLA-authorized ground for leave, ... the 
employee must communicate the ground to him; he cannot just 
demand leave." Id.
Spurling's remark to Bellant fails to meet this threshold. She 
did not inform him that she had a "serious health condition" 
nor did she have any personal knowledge of her own illness 
that would allow her to put forth such information. Spurling 
worked the night shift at C&M and many employees exhibited 
sleeping issues during that shift, as Spurling conceded witness-
2
While the parties dispute that Spurling made a statement regarding leave 
from work, for the purposes of summary judgment we view the record in 
the light most favorable to the non-movant. Foley v. City o f Lafayette, 359 
F.3d 925, 928 (7th Cir. 2004). Therefore, we accept Spurling's account of the 
April 16 discussion.
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ing while at work. Furthermore, Spurling had problems 
remaining awake in the past and had previously attributed the 
behavior to medication. Thus, Spurling's sleep issues were not 
something novel that would automatically alert an employer 
that something was amiss; sleeping on the job was a difficulty 
that many night shift employees endured and one that Spurl- 
ing had already been disciplined for. Cf. Byrne v. Avon Products, 
Inc., 328 F.3d 379, 380 (7th Cir. 2003) (drastic change in behav­
ior of a model employee could suffice as proper notice of a 
serious medical condition under the FMLA). Spurling's vague 
assertion that she needed time off to determine why she was 
falling asleep was not sufficient to put C&M on notice that she 
had a serious medical condition that required FMLA leave.
III. Co n c lu sio n
Spurling established disputed issues of material facts as to 
whether C&M failed to properly engage in the interactive 
process as required by the ADA, but did not provide sufficient 
notice to establish a claim under the FMLA. Accordingly, we 
AFFIRM the entry of summary judgment for C&M on the 
FMLA claim, REVERSE the entry of summary judgment in 
favor of C&M on Spurling's ADA claim and REMAND for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
